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COMMENTS
CLASSIFIED BOARDS IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCrION
In all elections for directors or managers of any corporation, each share-
holder shall have the right to cast as many votes in the aggregate as shall
equal the number of shares held by him, multiplied by the number of di-
rectors or managers to be elected, and may cast the whole number of votes,
either in person or by proxy for one candidate, or distribute such votes
among two or more candidates; and such directors or managers shall not
be elected in any other manner; provided, that this section shall not apply
to cooperative associations, societies or exchanges organized under the law.
MISSOURI CONSTITUTION art. XI, § 6.
(Except for proviso, substantially identical
to MO. CONST. art. XII, § 6 (1875))1
Literally this provision grants three rights: to choose directors by election, to
vote, and to cumulate. Corporate elections are usually held annually to select an
entire board of directors. In the case of vacancies statutes provide for appointment
of directors to fill such vacancies. 2 In two states, under proper circumstances, stat-
utes provide for appointment of a provisional director by a court.3 Where a con-
stitution prescribes the manner of selecting directors, "appointments" without
shareholder elections have been challenged; 4 however, a discussion of the problem
is beyond the scope of this comment.
The language of the constitutional provision giving the shareholder as many
votes as he has shares, has been held to apply only to shares which are entitled to
vote by corporate charter or shareholder agreement.5 Thus, the right of cumulative
voting in director elections is guaranteed only to voting shares.6
1. The adoption of a provision in the same terms as in a former constitution
carries the meaning of the prior provision into the new constitution. 1 COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 136 (8th ed. 1926), citing Sanders v. St. L. & N. 0.
Anchor Line, 97 Mo. 26, 30, 10 S.W. 595, 597 (1888).
2. § 351.320, RSMo 1959.
3. § 351.323, RSMo 1959; CAL. CoaP. CODE § 819.
4. Compare People ex. rel. Weber v. Cohn, 339 Ill. 121, 171 N.E. 186 (1930)(vacancy-filling by board held to be an unconstitutional denial of cumulative vot-
ing right), with. Wickersham v. Brittan, 93 Cal. 34, 38 (1898) (cumulative voting
not applicable to "appointment" of directors to fill vacancies). See PEARCY, Mis-
SOURI GENERAL AND BUSINESS CORP. LAW 258 (1948).
5. State ex rel. Frank v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561, 89 S.W. 872 (En Banc(1905); Shapiro v. Tropicana Lanes, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1963). Cf. Sensa-
baugh v. Polson Plywood Co., 135 Mont. 562, 342 P.2d 1064 (1959) (dictum).
Contra, People's Home Say. Bank v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. 649 (1894) (dictum),
Centrifugal Nat'l Concentrator Co. v. Eccleston, 122 Cal. App. 698, 10 P.2d 1033
(1932) (dictum); Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, 26 Del. 1, 79 At. 790 (1911);
People ex rel. Wateska Tel. Co. v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922);
State ex rel. Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. O'Brien, 142 W. Va. 451, 96 S.E.2d
171 (1956).
6. Apparently shares must either be completely disenfranchised or be given
full voting rights, for a class of shares may not be given voting rights restricted
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The constitutional provision grants the shareholder the right to add all his
votes together and distribute them among the candidates as he sees fit. This super-
sedes several systems of electing directors. 7 Cumulative voting makes it possible
for shareholders to have representation on the board of directors roughly propor-
tional to their interests in the corporation.
The purpose of this comment is to examine one of the several methods of
frustrating the constitutionally mandatory cumulative voting right.
It is the practice of some business corporations, permitted by statute, to divide
their boards of directors into groups and stagger the election of the groups. The
purpose of such classification is said to be the assurance of continuity of policy on
the board. Curiously, cumulative voting was early thought to serve a like purpose.8
Another probable reason for the enactment of statutes authorizing classification was
the great competition among the states for passing favorable incorporation acts.
The Missouri statute permitting classified boards and staggered elections in business
and manufacturing companies probably was originally taken from a similar Illinois
provision.0
Classification has been challenged on the ground that it impairs or diminishes
the effect of cumulative voting and thus undermines the constitutional right.10 The
percentage of voting shares required to elect a director by cumulative voting in-
creases as the number of directors to be elected is reduced. A nine-man board will
only to the election of one-half of the directors. Op's. Ary. Gm. or Mo., August
24, 1964, No. 238. Cf., Diamond v. Parkersburg-Aetna Corp., 146 W. Va. 543, 122
S.E.2d 436 (1961). Query whether a fractional share is entitled to vote. State ex
rel. Frank v. Swanger, supra note 5, held that the right to vote may be denied to
preferred shareholders by an agreement between the shareholders. No Missouri
case has held that the legislature may constitutionally deny this right. Yet, §
351.300, RSMo 1959 provides that fractional shares are not voting shares unless
otherwise provided. It is submitted that a fractional shareholder has the right to
cast a fractional vote in director elections by virtue of the constitutional cumulative
voting provision. See Peterson, The Right to Vote a Fractional Share of Stock, 87
CENT. L. J. 222 (1918), Kraus, Cumulative Voting for Directors in Missouri Cor-
porations, 16 J. Mo. BAR 441, 445 (1960).
7. The common law "rule of numbers" allowed only one vote to each share-
holder, regardless of his interest in the corporation. The modern "rule of interest"
gave all shareholders one vote per share, but enabled majority shareholders to ex-
clude the minority from any representation on the board. See State ex re. Law-
rence v. McGann, 64 Mo. App. 225, 231 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895).
8. In 1844 Thomas Gilpin, who laid the theoretical basis for minority repre-
sentation generally and for cumulative voting in particular, wrote that minority
representation in elected bodies "would produce the steadiness of legislation, would
prevent the sudden dismission of all the representatives of a party from power at
any one time." (Emphasis in original.) Gilpin, On the Representation of Minori-
ties to Act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies, reprinted as, An.Early Essay
on Proportional Representation, 7 ANNALS 233, 243 (1896). Perhaps it is thought
to serve this purpose even today. See Stephen, Cumulative Voting and Classified
Boards: Some Reflections on Wolfson v. Avery, 31 NOTRE DAE LAw. 351, 376(1956).
9. Compare § 351.315(1), RSMo 1959 (first enacted in 1881), with Ill. Laws
1871-72, at 296. The Illinois provision was the only general classification statute
in existence in 1881. It was held unconstitutional in Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill.2d 78,
126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
10. E.g., Wolfson v. Avery, slpra note 9.
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serve as an example. Under cumulative voting, if all nine directors are selected at
one time, 10% of the shares plus one will elect a director. However, if the board
is divided into three classes and only three directors elected at one time, 25% plus
one share is required to elect a director.11 Classification thus dilutes the effect of
cumulative voting. A corporation could undoubtedly incorporate with a three-man
board. The question is whether it can constitutionally achieve a three-director elec-
tion by dividing the board into classes of three. 2
II. ONE DiREcrOa CLASSES
If only one man is to be elected, the effect of cumulative voting, which is to
aggregate the votes for all directors on one or more candidates, is gone. Thus, where
majority shareholders attempted to elect seven directors, singly, on seven separate
ballots, a California court held that the election violated the constitutional cumu-
lative voting provision.' 3 Similarly, it has been held that the board may not be
divided into classes so that only one director may be elected annually.14
There are no Missouri cases on this point. However, article XI, section 6 gives
the right to multiply the number of shares times "the number of directors or mana-
gers to be elected. . . ." The use of the plural in this context is not without pur-
pose.15 It is submitted that this language necessarily contemplates that more than
one director will be elected at each election.
There are other indications that the constitution does not sanction one-man
elections. Prior to the adoption of the cumulative voting provision in the 1875
constitution, no general and probably no special incorporation law had specifically
authorized a board of directors with fewer than three members. 16 At the constitu-
11. WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECrORS 48 (1951), Kraus, Cumu-
lative Voting for Directors in Missouri Corporations, 16 J. Mo. BAR 401, 407 (1960).
12. See Shearman v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 250 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1957) (in-
junction against constitutional challenge of classified board in a state court upheld
pending final decision on reorganization plan in federal court).
13. Wright v. Central Calif. Colony Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885),
cited witk approval in State ex rel. Frank v. Swanger, supra note 5, at 576, 89 S.W.
at 876.
14. Stockholders' Comm. v. Erie Technological Prods., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 380
(W.D. Penn. 1965). Accord, Bohannon v. Corp. Comm'n, 82 Ariz. 299, 301, 313
P.2d 379, 381 (1957) (dictum); Wolfson v. Avery, supra note 9, at 87, 126 N.E.2d
at 707 (dictum); State ex rel. Syphers v. McCune, 143 W. Va. 315, 101 S.E.2d
834 (1958).
15. It is presumed that constitutions are drafted with care. In construing
them, courts strive to adopt a construction which will render every word operative
and leave nothing idle or nugatory. Brown v. Morris, 365 Mo. 946, 290 S.W.2d
160 (En Banc 1956), Wolfson v. Avery, supra note 9, at 99, 126 N.E.2d at 713
(dissenting opinion), COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 128.
16. The pre-1865 special incorporation acts are too numerous to cite. The gen-
eral incorporation laws in force at the time of the constitutional convention and
the number of directors authorized by each were: railroad companies, Mo. Laws
1865, ch. 70, at 29, § 6 (3 to 7 directors); road companies, Mo. Laws 1865,
ch. 71, at 40, § 5 (3 to 9 directors); insurance companies, Mo. Laws 1865, ch. 74,
at 51, §5 (5 to 9 directors); savings banks and loan companies, Mo. Laws 1865,
ch. 75, at 62, § 3 (5 to 13 directors); manufacturing and business companies, Mo.
Laws 1865, ch. 76, at 65, § 3 (3 to 13 directors). One general law, authorizing the
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tional convention of 1875 Mr. Albert Todd proposed, unsuccessfully, a cumulative
voting provision for all state-wide political elections:
At every election in which there shall be more than one person to be
elected for the like office, any voter may cast for any designated candidate,
as many votes as there are persons to be elected or may distribute his votes
among the candidates at his discretion.' 7
Apparently, it was known that the cumulative voting system would work only
where more than one office was to be filled.
It has been suggested that since cumulative voting contemplates the election
of more than one director, the constitutional mandate simply is not directed to
one-director elections.' 8 But if this had been the intent of the framers of the cor-
porate cumulative voting provision, it is likely that they would have used language
similar to Mr. Todd's proposal. Moreover, article XI, section 6 directs that cumu-
lative voting be used "in all elections for directors or managers" (excluding none).
The provision concludes with the prohibition that "such directors or managers shall
not be elected in any other manner." It is submitted that the constitutionally con-
templated effect of cumulative voting is destroyed and the constitution violated
by one-director classes and by section 351.315(1), RSMo 1959 which permits in-
corporation with one-man boards.
III. CLASSES OF MORE THAN ONE DIRECTOR
A. Decisions
Most classified boards consist of groups of more than one director. This prac-
tice dilutes the cumulative voting right. Its constitutionality was first challenged
in WVolfson v. Avery.19 The Illinois Supreme Court construed the purpose of the
cumulative voting provision to be to provide representation on the board in pro-
portion to interest in the corporation. Since classified boards and staggered elections
make the representation disproportionate, the statute allowing it was held uncon-
stitutional. The West Virginia Supreme Court reached the same result 20 California
courts have also held that cumulative voting was intended to afford representation
in proportion to interest 2 l
incorporation of telegraph companies, may have authorized a board of less than
three directors. The stockholders were given the authority to elect "such number
of directors as they may determine. .. ." Mo. Laws 1865, ch. 72, at 44, § 1. (Em-
phasis added.)
17. 1 JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875 448
(hereinafter cited as "JouRNAL"). (Emphasis added.) See also, 2 JOURNAL 717.
18. Moudy, Cwmulative Voting Versus Classification of Directors, 22 Mo. L.
REv. 38, 43 (1957).
19. 6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.S.2d 701 (1955); Stephen, op. cit. supra note 8; Notes,
69 HARv. L. REv. 380 (1955); 55 MicH. L. REv. 997 (1956); 50 Nw. U. L. REv.
112 (1955); 103 U. PA. L. REv. 822 (1955).
20. State ex rel. Syphers v. McCune, 143 W. Va. 315, 101 S.E.2d 834 (1958).
21. In Film Producers, Inc. v. Jordan, 171 Cal. 664, 154 Pac. 605 (1916),
articles of incorporation gave one vote per share to common stock, having a par
value of $1, and preferred stock, having a par value of $20. Since "shares," as used
[Vol. 32
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On the other hand, the constitutionality of a classification statute was upheld
in Janney v. Phikdelphia Transp. Co.22 In the Arizona case of Bohannon v. Corp.
Comwo'n 23 the practice of classification was upheld under a constitutional cumula-
tive voting provision nearly identical to article XI, section 6 of the Missouri con-
stitution. Curiously, the court held that the mention of providing minority share-
holders with a "look-in" on the board at the 1910 constitutional convention did not
indicate that cumulative voting was intended to afford proportional representation.
24
Another basis for the Bohannon decision was that the 1910 constitution "assumes
the existence of a system of laws which is to remain in force... .25 Apparently this
was a reference to the widespread popularity of classified boards when the Arizona
constitution was adopted.2 6
Certain criteria are consistently used to judge the validity of classification.
The courts look first to the plain and natural meaning of the various constitutional
provisions.27 Each court has decided or assumed that the language of the particular
constitutional provision neither clearly contemplates nor prohibits classified boards.
The "system" of corporate elections in force at the time of the adoption of the
constitution is another factor in the decisions. These two criteria will be discussed
immediately. A third criterion, the intended purpose of the constitutional cumula-
tive voting provision, will later be discussed.
B. The Meaning of "Directors to be Elected" and the
"Well-Understood Systev"
One of the most persistent defenses of classification has been that the phrase,
"the number of directors or managers to be elected," as used in the constitution
in the statutory cumulative voting provision, were merely representatives of value,
it was not a sufficient compliance with the law merely to give each share one vote.
The articles were held to be in violation of the cumulative voting statute because
the statute was intended to give shareholders voting power "in proportion to their
interest in the capital stock of the corporation." Id. at 666, 154 Pac. at 606. (Em-
phasis added.) In Del Monte Light & Power Co. v. Jordan, 196 Cal. 488, 238 Pac.
710 (1925) (par and no par stock), the Film Producers case was given constitu-
tional status. Since these holdings effectively required that all stock be issued at
identical par values, the California Bar advocated repeal of the constitutional cumu-
lative voting provision. 1928 CALIF. B. PROC. 187. CAL. CONsT. art. XII, § 12,
was repealed in 1930.
22. 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956), Sell, Corporations, 19 U. Prrr. L. REV.
277-81 (1958); Notes, 55 MiCH. L. REV. 997 (1956); 26 U. CINc. L. REv. 312
(1957).
23. 82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379 (1957).
24. Id. at 303, 313 P.2d at 382.
25. Id. at 304, 313 P.2d at 382.
26. In 1910 there were approximately nineteen states which expressly author-
ized classified boards: Delaware, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Virginia. A section in
Thompson's treatise was devoted to the subject. 1 THoMpsoN, PRIVATE CoRPoRA-
TIONS § 791 (1st ed. 1895).
27. See 1 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 130.
1967]
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contemplates the election at any time of fewer than the total number of directors.28
As part of a constitution, this ambiguous language must, if possible, be given
effect.20 The phrase in question can be used to justify classification only if the
framers so intended it.
In ascertaining whether this language contemplates classified boards, one must
keep in mind the maxim that a constitution "assumes the existence of a well-under-
stood system which is to remain in force and be administered, but under such limita-
tions and restrictions as that instrument imposes. . . .s Hence, a second inquiry:
Were classified boards part of the "well-understood system" in 1875?
There are three plausible meanings of "the number of directors or managers
to be elected" in the context of cumulative voting.
Classification. It is scarcely possible that by the qualifying phrase, "to be
elected," the framers had in mind the practice of classifying boards and staggering
elections. If the clause were to be written today, it might be otherwise.3 ' But at the
time of the 1875 Constitutional Convention classified boards were almost unheard
of in this country0 2
Prior to 1865 most Missouri corporations were created by special or private acts
of the legislature.33 One of the earliest acts, creating the Bank of St. Louis in 1813,
provided for thirteen directors "who shall hold their offices for one year ... and
shall be elected on the second Monday in December in every year. . . Y34 In similar
terms nearly all special acts of that period set a certain day for yearly elections of
all directors.3 5
28. See Adkins, Corporate Democracy and Classified Boards, 11 Bus. LAw.
31, 36 (1958), Moudy, op. cit. supra note 18, at 46, Sell & Fuge, Inpact of Classi-
fied Corporate Directorates on the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting, 17
U. PITT. L. REv. 151, 168 (1956); Notes, 69 HAtv. L. REv. 380 (1955), 55 MicH.
L. REv. 997, 1002 (1956), 26 U. CINc. L. REv. 312, 315 (1957), 103 U. PA. L. REV.
822, 826 (1955). But cf., Stephen, op. cit. supra note 8, at 373.
29. Wolfson v. Avery, supra note 9, at 99. 126 N.E.2d at 713; 1 CooLE,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 128. For Missouri law to this effect, see note 15 supra.
30. State v. Harp, 320 Mo. 1, 6 S.W.2d 562 (En Banc 1928); 1 COOLEY, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 133. See also, Bohannon v. Corp. Comm., supra note 25.
31. At least forty states currently allow classification. See Wolfson v. Avery,
supra note 9, at 106, 126 N.E.2d at 716 (dissenting opinion). But cf., NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, STUDIES IN BUSINESS POLICY, No. 103, at 25 (the
overwhelming majority of firms surveyed elect directors for one year terms an-
nually).
32. Classification was authorized in only one state. See note 9 supra. It was
not until 1891 that classified boards in stock companies were referred to in any
textbook:
In the American States directors are usually elected annually to serve one
year. But in England under the Companies Clauses Act of 1845, they serve
three years, one-third retiring from offices annually.
BEACH, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 226, at 379 (1891).
33. Pittman, Nonvoting Shares-In Missouri, 26 Mo. L. REv. 117, 127, n.33
(1961).
34. Mo. Terr. Laws 1813, at 68.
35. See, e.g., the following acts: Bank of Missouri, Mo. Terr. Laws 1816-17,
at 100; Cape Girardeau Mill Co., Mo. Laws 1826, at 11, §§ 5, 7; Ins. Co. of St.
Louis, Mo. Laws 1830, at 61, § 6; Marine Ins. Co. of St. Louis, Mo. Laws 1834-35,
at 58, § 6.
[Vol. 32
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Other typical provisions, requiring the election of an entire new board of di-
rectors yearly, were:
[the directors] "shall be elected by the stockholders at their regular annual
meetings ...and shall hold their offices for one year," or
"the directors shall hold their offices one year . . . elections for directors,
shall be holden annually," or
"the affairs of the company shall be managed by a board of five directors,
to be elected annually by the shareholders."
From 1813 to 1865 corporations continued to be created by special acts. Of the 756
special acts incorporating stock companies prior to 1865, 726, or 96%, provided for
annual elections for all directors. (See Appendix.)
The first general incorporation act was passed in 1849. This permitted the for-
mation of companies organized for manufacturing, mining, mechanical and chemical
purposes. The articles of incorporation were to name the directors for the first year
and
not less than three, nor more than nine directors ... shall, except the first
year, be annually elected by the stockholders . 36
In 1855 four general incorporation acts were enacted. Three of these laws, author-
izing the incorporation of railroad associations,37 road companies a8 and companies
formed for manufacturing, mining, mechanical or chemical purposes,8 9 required
yearly elections for the entire board. The remaining act, which authorized the for-
mation of fund associations,40 contained no provisions relating to elections.
The 1865 constitution forbade the creation of private corporations by special
act 4 1 In that year a general act relating to manufacturing and business companies
provided for "directors, not less than three no[r] more than thirteen in number
... to be elected by ballot by the stockholders in said company for one year ... 142
Similarly, the directors were to be elected annually for one year terms in all railroad
companies,43 macadamized, graded and plank road companies,44 telegraph com-
panies, 45 and insurance companies.46 The general act relating to savings banks and
fund companies provided only that the directors were to serve for one year.47
Thus, nearly every special or general incorporation law prior to 1875 pro-
36. Mo. Laws 1849, at 18, § 3.
37. Ch. 39, § 5, at 408, RSMo 1855 provided that the directors "shall be
chosen annually. . ."
38. Ch. 38, § 5, at 395, RSMo 1855.
39. Ch. 37, § 3, at 385, RSMo 1855.
40. Ch. 36, at 381, RSMo 1855.
41. Art. VIII, § 4.
42. Mo. Laws 1865, ch. 76, at 65, § 3.
43. Mo. Laws 1865, ch. 70, at 29, § 6.
44. Mo. Laws 1865, ch. 71, at 40, § 5.
45. Mo. Laws 1865, ch. 72, at 44, § 3.
46. Mo. Laws 1865, ch. 74, at 51, § 5 (fire and marine), and at 57, § 37(life, health and accident).
47. Mo. Laws 1865, ch. 75, at 62, § 3.
19671
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vided for annual elections of all directors. Classification, by comparison, was prac-
tically nonexistent in Missouri prior to the 1875 constitution.
The first stock company in Missouri which was permitted to classify its board
was the Missouri Iron Company in 1836. The nine-man board was divided into two
classes of five and four directors, respectively. Each class was to serve for two
years.48 Another typical provision was one authorizing a board of twenty directors
to be divided into five classes of four directors each so that "the terms of service
of one of said classes shall expire at the end of two years, one at the end of four
years . . ." (and so forth) .4 However, this practice was not very popular. By 1865
only twenty-five out of the 756 stock companies incorporated has classified boards.50
(See Appendix.)
None of the general incorporation acts of 1849, 1855, or 1865 allowed classi-
fication. Only one general incorporation act prior to 1875 permitted this practice in
Missouri stock companies. The statute, passed in 1872, permitted railroad com-
panies to divide their boards into three equal classes. Only one class was to be
elected every year.51 The purpose of this act is significant. It was entitled "An act
for the better regulation of railroad companies and to protect the rights of minority
shareholders."5 2 The Grangers were responsible for this and other legislation regu-
lating railroads for the protection of the public. 3 The probable object of this par-
ticular statute was to prevent "rings" of speculators, such as the infamous "Erie
Railroad ring," from purchasing a bare voting majority of stock in small railroad
companies, electing only their own agents to the board, and quickly selling the
companies from under the minority stockholders.54 Although classification post-
poned the capture of the board by such "rings," some more permanent protection
for minority shareholders was written into the 1875 constitution.
48. Mo. Laws 1836, at 220, § 2.
49. This appeared in the act which incorporated Missouri Life Ins. & Trust
Co. Mo. Laws 1836, at 207, § 9.
50. Among these were nine business and manufacturing companies, seven in-
surance companies, seven savings fund associations, one loan association and one
utility company. These figures do not include several state banks authorized to
classify by a general act of 1857. Mo. Laws 1856-57, at 21, art. I, § 23. In 1863
these banks were dissolved and reorganized under the provisions of the National
Banking Act. Mo. Laws 1863-64, at 9. The National Banking Act provided for not
less than five directors to be elected annually for one year terms. Ch. 106, §§ 9, 10,
13 Stat. 102 (1864). It is noteworthy that in Illinois, which held classification un-
constitutional, there were at least 124 stock companies created by special act prior
to the 1870 constitution which had classified boards. See note, 55 MIcH. L. REv.
997, 1003 (1956). See also, note, 50 Nw. U. L. Rzv. 112 (1955).
51. Mo. Laws 1872, at 68.
52. See Senate Journal, Twenty-Sixth General Assembly, Adj. Sess. 724 (1871-
53. 2 Williams & Shoemaker, MIssouRI, MOTHER OF THE WEST 274 (1930).
See statutes cited in Shoemaker, MISSOURI AND MISSOURIANS 17 (1943).
54. During the debate on cumulative voting at the Ohio Constitutional Con-
vention of 1874 a Mr. Ewing explained that this was the sole purpose behind
"staggered" elections (referring to classification). 2 OHIO DEBATES 2407. This was
also one of the reasons for cumulative voting. Ibid.; Wolfson v. Avery, supra note
9, at 92, 126 N.E.2d at 709; 3 DEBATES AND PROCEEEDINGS IN THE NEBRASKA CON-
[V/ol. 32
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It is fair to say that by 1875 classification was only rarely used in stock com-
panies except to protect minority shareholders in railroad companies.
Sliding boards. Another possible explanation of the phrase "the number of
directors or managers to be elected" is that it contemplates the possibility that the
number of directors on the board will vary from year to year. In "sliding boards"
there is a minimum and a maximum number of directors "to be elected." Prior to
each annual meeting, the shareholders decide upon the number of directors to be
elected for the ensuing year.
Sliding boards were very popular in nineteenth-century stock companies. Prob-
ably the first special act permitting a sliding board was Mine A'La Motte & Mis-
sissippi Railroad Company in 1836. It provided that at the annual meetings the
stockholders were "to choose - directors. .. ."55 Other acts provided for a sum
certain of directors "and such others as the stockholders may appoint."56 Typical
acts authorizing sliding boards prior to 1865 contained such provisions regarding
the number of directors "to be elected" as:
"such number of their own body as they [shareholders] may deem ex-
pedient," or
"not less than five," or
"not less than three, nor more than five," or
"five directors (which may be increased at any time by majority vote of
the stockholders to seven)," or
"not exceeding thirteen."
Of the 756 special acts incorporating stock companies prior to 1865, approximately
177, or one in every four, contained similar provisions. (See Appendix.)
In 1875, about four months before the cumulative voting provision was pro-
posed at the constitutional convention, one special act was amended to allow the
shareholders "to designate by resolution . . . the number of directors of which the
board shall consist, not less than five nor more than fifteen. .. !,5
The provisions in general incorporation acts are typified by the 1849 act re-
lating to manufacturing, mining, mechanical and chemical companies. It provided
for "not less than three, nor more than nine directors .. ."1 The articles of in-
corporation were to specify only "the number of directors to be elected for the first
year. . . .59 Nearly identical provisions appeared in all general incorporation laws
prior to 1875, except for an 1855 act relating to fund associations 60 and an 1865
act relating to telegraph companies.61 Although sliding boards were not specifically
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1871) 104 (hereinafter cited as "NEBasKA DEBAESs");
4 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1872-73) 605. See
also, Kraus, op. cit. supra, note 11, at 402.
55. Mo. Laws 1836, at 261, § 5. The act incorporating Weston Gas-Light Co.
contained an identical provision. Mo. Laws 1856, at 492, § 6.
56. See, e.g., Mo. Laws 1847, at 151, § 2.
57. Mo. Laws 1875, at 441, § 41.
58. Mo. Laws 1849, at 19, § 3.
59. Id., § 1.
60. Ch. 36, at 381, RSMo 1855.
61. Mo. Laws 1865, ch. 72, at 44, § 1.
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authorized by these acts, they probably were permissible in view of their popularity
and the fact that the articles were only to state the number of directors to be
elected at the first election.0 2
Thus, sliding boards were authorized in one-fourth of the special acts and prob-
ably in nearly every general incorporation act prior to 1875.
Variations in the size of corporate boards. The phrase, "the number of di-
rectors or managers to be elected," may simply refer to the different sizes of cor-
porate directorates. Prior to the 1875 constitution the number of directors in Mis-
souri corporations had always varied from three to thirteen or more. 3 It would
have been impractical to specify a particular number of directors for all the hun-
dreds of corporate bodies in Missouri. The use of the phrase in question merely
"searches out all such bodies in the State without exception and applies to them
the needed reform." 64
In determining which of the three possible meanings is to be attributed to the
constitutional language, one must keep in mind the "well-understood system" at
the time of the constitution's adoption. 65 While the "system" was primarily the
practice of having a fixed number of directors (from three to thirteen) with one
year terms, the practice of sliding boards was rather widely recognized. Classified
boards and staggered elections, in comparison, were uncommon in 1875. This prac-
tice could not reasonably have been a "well-understood system" of electing directors
in stock companies nor was it likely to have been in the minds of the original
framers of article XI, section 6.
C. Proportional Representation in 1875
The cases have generally held that if the intended purpose of a cumulative
voting provision is to provide proportional representation, classified boards and
staggered elections are unconstitutional because they make representation dispro-
portionate to interest. 0  The purpose of most provisions has been ascertained by
62. See Lyons, Changes in the General and Business Corporation Law, 18 Mo.
B. J. 90 (1962). This practice is no longer permissible. The articles must state the
number of directors "to constitute the board of directors. . . ." § 351.055(6), RSMo
1959.
63. See statutes cited note 16 supra.
64. 3 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE THIRD CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF OIO 2410 (1874) (hereinafter cited as "OHIO DEBATES"). A cumulative voting
provision had been proposed at the convention. This remark, by Mr. Miner, came
after it had been pointed out that there were several thousand corporations with
varying numbers of directors and that the language should be broad enough to cover
every conceivable directorate. A Mr. Smith had earlier suggested an alternative to
the broad language of the proposed section-i.e., that it list the exact number of
votes each share would have where the number of directors was three, four, five,
and on ad infinitum. Id. at 2409. Mr. Smith's suggestion was not accepted by the
convention.
65. See note 30 supra.
66. Wolfson v. Avery, supra note 9, at 94, 126 N.E.2d at 710; Bohannon v.
Corp. Comm'n, supra note 14, at 302, 313 P.2d at 381, State ex rel. Syphers v.
McCune, supra note 14, at 323, 101 S.E.2d at 839 (1958). In Janney v. Philadel-
phia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. at 289, 128 A.2d at 80, the court held that cumulative
voting was intended to provide an opportunity to obtain proportional representa-
[Vol. 32
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analyzing the constitutional convention debates on cumulative voting. There was
no debate on corporate cumulative voting at the 1875 Missouri Constitutional Con-
vention. However, the general understanding of cumulative voting circa 1875 in-
dicates that the probable purpose of article XI, section 6 was to provide for pro-
portional representation.
Cumulative voting was first propounded by various political theorists such as
Thomas Gilpin 67 and John Stuart Mill68 as a means of achieving proportional rep-
resentation in representative assemblies. Shortly after the Civil War it was advo-
cated in the United States as a reform of legislatures by David Dudley Field,69
Horace Greeley,70 Senator Buckalew of Pennsylvania, 7 1 and Joseph Medill of the
Chicago Tribune.72
Champions of "corporate democracy" at the Illinois Constitutional Conven-
tion wrote proportional representation into the corporate law in the form of a
cumulative voting provision." 3 The adoption of corporate cumulative voting, as a
device to achieve representation in proportion to interest, was considered by con-
stitutional conventions in New York (1867), 74 Nebraska (1871), 7 5 West Virginia
(1872),76 Pennsylvania (1872-73), 7 7 and Ohio (1874)Y8
tion, but not to guarantee such representation in any event. The court failed to
explain how there is such an "opportunity" where there are classified boards and
staggered elections.
67. GILPIN, op cit supra note 8, at 243.
68. "In a really equal democracy any section would be represented, not dispro-
portionately, but proportionately." Mill, Of True and False Democracy-Repre-
sentation of all and Representation of the 'Majority Only, in CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 102, 103 (1958). Later in this passage Mill states
that his remarks on cumulative voting as premised, in part, on a pamphlet by an
American, James Garth Marshall.
69. In a paper read before the American Social Science Association in 1870
Field listed cumulative voting as one of six practical applications of proportional
representation. Representation of Minorities, 3 J. Soc. Sci. 133, 142 (1871).
70. See 2 DEBATES OF THE NEw YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION Or 1867
1092 (hereinafter cited as "NEw YORK DEBATES").
71. In Congress, Senator Buckalew consistently referred to cumulative vot-
ing as "proportional representation." See, e.g., Buckalew, Report from the Select
Committee on Representative Reform, CONG. GLOBE APp., 40th Cong., 3rd Sess. 268
(1869).
72. Wolfson v. Avery, supra note 9, at 89, 126 N.E.2d at 708.
73. Id. at 94, 126 N.E.2d at 710.
74. Both the proponents and the opponents of corporate cumulative voting in
New York understood cumulative voting to be a device to obtain representation
strictly in proportion to interest. See 2 Nzw YORK DEBATES 1092-98. The pro-
vision was rejected by the Convention.
75. The only remarks on the proposed section, nearly identical to Missouri's
cumulative voting provision, were by a Mr. Wakeley. The words which Mr. Wakeley
chose to describe this provision were "proportionate representation." 3 NEBRASKA
DEBATES 104. An identical provision was adopted without debate in 1875 and is
now article XII, section 5 of the Nebraska Constitution.
76. The debates on West Virginia's constitutional cumulative voting pro-
vision are not available. However, the 1872 constitution did authorize the legisla-
ture to propose "a plan or scheme of proportional representation in the Senate ... "
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5. Classification, being a device "which prevents full en-joyment" of the cumulative voting right, is unconstitutional in West Virginia. State
1967]
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The debates at the Missouri convention of 1875 on a related provision-cumu-
lative voting for Representatives in the General Assembly 7 0-indicate that this new
system of voting had a similar purpose in Missouri. During this discussion cumu-
lative voting was referred to as "proportional representation." 0
IV. CONSnTUCnTON
The most impressive evidence that the cumulative voting provision was not
intended to permit classification came after the adoption of the constitution of
1875. The task of implementing its provision fell to the Twenty-Ninth General As-
sembly, which convened in January, 1877. Cumulative voting promptly was made
mandatory in all elections for directors of savings banks. This law also provided
that savings bank directors, not less than three nor more than thirteen, were to
be elected annually for one year terms.81 In the same spirit the General Assembly
took another look at the 1872 railroad classification statute. Possibly the legislators
believed that classification violated the constitutional cumulative voting provision
ex rel. Syphers v. McCune, supra note 14, at 323, 101 S.E.2d at 839. (Emphasis
added.)
77. Apparently the delegates at the Pennsylvania constitutional convention
understood that cumulative voting would give minority shareholders "the power of
electing as many of the directors and managers of a corporation as their number
of shares will entitle them to. . . ." 4 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTrU-
TIONAL CONVENTION [1872-73 J 593 (hereinafter cited as "PENNSYLVANIA DEBATES").
Delegate Buckalew, a former United States Senator, was instrumental in getting
the corporate cumulative voting provision adopted by the convention. See WiL-
LrAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DnIEcrORs 27 (1951); Maynard v. Bd. of Can-
vassers, 84 Mich 228 (1890). He felt that cumulative voting would provide the
shareholder with representation "proportionate to the interest which he hold. . ....
4 PENNSYLVANIA DEBATES 605. See also note 71 supra.
78. The delegates at the Ohio convention understood that the purpose of cu-
mulative voting was to give any number of shares "its exact proportional influence
in the choice [of directors]." 2 OHIO DEBATES 2409. The debates on cumulative vot-
ing were indexed under "Proportional Representation." The corporate cumulative
voting provision was adopted by the convention, but rejected by the people.
79. One proposal, offered by Mr. Thomas Gantt of St. Louis, would have ap-
plied cumulative voting to all elections for representatives. 1 JOURNAL OF THE
MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875 224. Gantt's idea was rejected by
the convention.
80. After a state-wide cumulative voting section had failed, the St. Louis dele-
gation offered a provision which would have applied only to St. Louis County.
This would have given the right to cast "as many votes as there are Representa-
tives to be elected in said county," etc. 1 JOURNAL 378. (Emphasis added.) It was
withdrawn the next day by Mr. Gantt, who explained:
[Tihe St. Louis delegation consulted together yesterday and were unable
to agree with entire unanimity upon the subject of proportional represen-
tation; therefore they abandoned that project ...
4 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 268. (Emphasis added.)
It is noteworthy that Mr. J. C. Edwards, Chairman of the Corporations Commit-
tee which drafted the corporate cumulative voting provision, was a member of the
St. Louis delegation.
81. Mo. Laws 1877, at 29, § 5.
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by making representation disproportionate to interest s2 For whatever reason, the
1872 statute no longer served to "protect the rights of minority stockholders.' It
was repealed. Substituted in its place was the following:
At the next and all succeeding annual elections of directors by any railroad
company incorporated by any law of this state, the stockholders shall elect
a fiXl board of directors, (unless it is otherwise provided in the act incor-
porating such company), 8 3 who shall hold their offices for one year .... .84
Thus, the first legislature after the adoption of the 1875 constitution repealed
the only existing general classification statute and expressly forbade classified boards
and staggered elections in railroad corporations. A court would be justified in ap-
plying the maxim that great weight is to be afforded to the construction given to
a constitutional provision by the first legislature.8 5
After 1877, no doubts remained as to the purpose of the cumulative voting
provision. The cases assumed that this section was intended to grant representation
in proportion to interest.
State ex rel. Lawrence v. McGann, decided in 1895, held that shareholders
are entitled to elect no more than their equitable proportion of the board 80 Ten
82. After discussing the conflict between staggered elections and cumulative
voting the 1874 Ohio constitutional convention came to this conclusion. 3 OHIO
DEBATES 2339, 2405-2407.
83. This parenthesis was probably inserted to avoid possible application of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). This case held
that since incorporation by legislative act was a "contract" between the state and
corporation, the charter could not be changed by the legislature unless it reserved
the right to alter the charter. Some of the pre-1865 special incorporation acts in
Missouri had not reserved this right. Thus, companies created by an "act" were
exempted from the statute.
84. Mo. Laws 1877, at 373.
85. Rathjen v. Reorganized School District R-II, 284 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. En
Banc 1955); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821). See Wolfson
v. Avery, supra note 9, at 103, 126 N.E.2d at 715 (Hershey, J., dissenting). The
situation was different in Illinois. Since the first Illinois General Assembly made
classification inandatory (Ill. Laws 1871-72, at 625), the Wolfson dissenter would
have applied this maxim to validate classified boards.
86. 64 Mo. App. 225 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895). Due to the majority share-
holders' failure to cumulate, minority shareholders, otherwise entitled to elect only
two of the five directors, claimed three seats on the board. The majority share-
holders, realizing their mistake, submitted a second ballot with cumulated votes.
The second ballot was accepted and the three majority candidates declared direc-
tors. Upholding the validity of the election, the court stated:
These provisions were designed, as the terms indicate, to enable a minority
in interest of the stockholders to elect a minority of the directors. The
larger the minority, the greater the representation possible to be secured.
, * It can not be seriously contended for a moment that the object of
such provisions is to enable the minority in interest of the stockholders
present at the corporate meeting to elect the majority in number of the
directors. . . . (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 232. Thus, the court felt that a minority of shares, by virtue of cumulative
voting, was entitled to its proportional share of representation-and no more. It
would seem to follow from this that a majority of shares is entitled to no more
than a majority on the board.
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years later in State ex rel. Frank v. Swanger87 the Missouri Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of nonvoting preferred stock. The court held that the intended
purpose of article XI, section 6 was not to give each share one vote, but rather to
guarantee the cumulative voting right to shareholders having the right to vote.88
As if to emphasize a point already well-made, the court, citing the McGann case,
stated:
The object and purposes of this provision in our Constitution is well un-
derstood and has been judicially expounded on several occasions. Its pur-
pose was to introduce the principle of [the] cumulative system of voting
in elections of stockholders so as to secure to the minority of the company
a voice in the management of the affairs of the company in proportion to
the number of their shares . . ..
V. CONCLUSION
The cumulative voting provision of the 1945 constitution remained substantial-
ly the same as that contained in the 1875 constitution. The adoption of a provision
from a former constitution carries into the new constitution not only the original
meaning of the prior section,90 but also the interpretation which courts have placed
upon it.01 It is submitted that article XI, section 6 of the Missouri Constitution
provides for proportional representation and probably does not permit classified
boards and staggered elections destructive of its purpose.92
DAvID E. ROSENBAUM
87. 190 Mo. 561, 89 S.W.2d 872 (En Banc 1905).
88. Id. at 576, 89 S.W. at 876.
89. Id. at 575, 89 S.W. at 876. (Emphasis added.)
90. 1 CooLE', CONSTrrtrrONAL LmIrrAIONS 136 (8th ed. 1926), citing San-
ders v. St. L. & N.O. Anchor Line, 97 Mo. 26, 10 S.W. 595, 97 (1888).
91. Rathjen, supra note 85, at 519, Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck,
275 Mo. 339, 205 S.W. 196 (1918).
92. For a different analysis of the same problem, see Moudy, Cumulative
Voting Versus Classification of Directors, 22 Mo. L. REV. 38 (1957). See also,
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TOTALS 751 726 25
*This includes year of incorporation as a stock company only. Often the
original charter of a mutual company was amended in later years to authorize is-
suance of stock, election of directors, etc. The later year is counted as the year
of incorporation. The original voting provisions were seldom changed.
**This includes revivals of expired charters, but not extensions of charters.
tThis figure includes the number of such provisions under special acts, or,
in a few cases, under general laws. A few of the acts included here provided for
biennial elections of all directors, but, for the purposes of this comment, were no
different than the usual annual elections. A typical provision was: "That the affairs
of said company, shall be managed by five directors, who shall be elected by the
stockholders, once in two years. . . ." Mo. Laws 1850, at 40, § 5. Other typical
acts were: Mo. Laws 1848, at 224, § 4, Mo. Laws 1848, at 371, § 6.
ttThis includes all companies which were classified at their inception and all
that were amended to allow classified boards and staggered elections-as of the
date when classification was authorized. Several banks which were originally au-
thorized to classify, but were later required by law to elect all directors annually
for one year terms, are excluded. See note 50 supra.
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